Some fifty years ago scholars claimed the end of religion was nigh. More recently some at the fringe of the Christian religion have touted the imminent end of the world. But the world is still here; and religion of all sorts persists, although not without some considerable problems.
being manifest in terms of the declining role and social standing of religion with respect to societal institutions, together with an overall "decline in the extent to which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs." Karel Dobbelaere (2002, p. 23) refers to the idea of the "secular" as being that which is opposed to the "sacred" in the sense of implying "a cultural emancipation from religion". And, further, the more rampantly aggressive secularism born of the dismissal of religion present in various programmatic and policy forms (see Dobbelaere, 2002, p.23) , and which regards religion as merely a private and arbitrary choice, of no relevance to the public square (Heath Atchley, 2009, p. 2) , is certainly well in evidence. Yet despite such analyses, predictions and trends, religion has persisted and is palpably manifest. What it is we call religion is seemingly so deeply embedded within the human condition that, under many and varied guises, religion remains alive and very ubiquitously present.
Religion presents as a stubbornly persistent fact of life, but also in many quarters the harbinger and locus of very considerable problems. On the one hand, twentieth-century post-war processes of globalization and secularisation yielded an expectation of the eclipse of religion; on the other hand, today the world is witness to the 'return of religion' marked by inescapable diversity, myriad fundamentalisms, resurgent exclusivisms and problems of extremism that, by and large, I suggest are born of reactionary responses to the ubiquitous presence of different religions. The persistence and plurality of religion, with attendant contemporary problems, forms the substantive focus of this paper and can be formulated as two questions: Why does religion persist?
What constitutes the contemporary critical problematic of religion? In response to the first I wish to explore something of the interaction of what I will refer to as the narrative, ethical/experiential, and metaphysical dimensions of religion. And with respect to the second I propose to focus on the putative inability to adequately accommodate diversity that, I argue, lies at the root of religious extremism. But before I turn to these questions, I want to offer some orienting comment on the state of religion today, and also the study of it, at least in western societies such as Britain, New Zealand and Australia, and to highlight two recent scenarios of boundary and transgression, scenarios which represent a recurring type, even as the events I cite are bound to a specific time and place.
Linda Woodhead (2012, pp. 6-7) offers an astute observation on the variable receptivity in academia to religion and its study. Some hostilely reject it; others evince openness and appreciation. And where a profound secular attitude predominates, as is often the case in politics, international relations, arts and cultural studies for example, "[i]t is not just that religion gets caricatured and demonised. It's that it gets left out of the picture altogether" (Woodhead, 2012, p. 6) . Of this academic secularism she comments: "It's a crazily narrowminded approach, which has to turn a blind eye to the luxuriantly variegated religiosity of most of the world, and ignore the past, including our own"; and so she speaks of the need for a revolution "to correct the secular gaze that airbrushes religion away" (Woodhead, 2012, p. 6) . As she avers, mindful of the reality of religion in today's world: "A less secular bias in our universities, and a more mature understanding of religion, is needed. Most religion is fascination. Some is awe-inspiring. Some is ludicrous. A small part, often in combination with a political cause, is downright dangerous. But you need to be educated about it in order to have the confidence to discriminate" (Woodhead, 2012, p. 6 ). I could not agree more. Religion is increasingly in the news; it is increasingly a multifaceted ubiquitous phenomenon impinging on societies and individuals across the globe; yet it is also an increasingly marginalised subject, it would seem, at virtually all levels of our education systems. Almost everywhere the subject of Religious Studies is on the back foot. Secular society has succeeded in setting very firm boundaries to religion in the public sphere; transgressing those boundaries provokes, very often, reactions of hostile dismissal of religion. Yet more and more, across the globe, we see religion caught up in variety of boundary and transgression contexts: the assertion of religious identity-boundaries, clashes occurring at the borders where boundaries intersect -both spatially and conceptually -and a stream of transgressions involving religion, or at least religious motifs, now form a veritable news-casting staple.
In The Guardian of Monday 3 September, 2012, there were two items which rather expressed the interplay of boundaries and transgressions vis-à-vis religion. Both had to do with Islam. This in itself is a recurrent trope; but it is the specifics of each event which is worthy of attention. The first announced:
"Historian defends his programme on Islam" (p. 6). It had to do with a television programme on Channel Four ('Islam: the untold story', broadcast on 28 July) that focussed on the question: "whether, as Muslims have always believed, Islam was born fully formed in all its fundamentals, or else evolved gradually, over many years" (p. 6). The programme attracted numerous complaints with many accusing it of distorting the history of Islam. Not having seen the programme, but noting the response of the Director that suggests it was doing little more than stating the academically obvious to a wider audience -perhaps a little akin to the role played by John A.T. Robinson's Honest to God in rehearsing standard academic fare in a form palatable to a general Christian readership in the 1960s, and so provoking a hostile response -I could only but wonder about what was really going on. What is this issue all about? What is the phenomenon here taking place? What is the source of the religious contention? On the surface of it, it seems the reaction to the programme was in the nature of an affront being given (or rather taken) by virtue of a received tradition being publicly challenged. A boundary had been crossed in raising a question and posing responses that undermined a fixed position. And this suggests that, to some extent, we are witnessing an example, in the hostile reactions, of a 'fixation on the fixed'; of concern for boundaries and the charge of transgression in respect to a perceived breach.
Persistence of religion is identified with maintaining a fixed conceptual status quo; and this fixed position is itself inimical to any suggestion of plurality of perspective or diversity of interpretation, let alone the admittance of propriety in respect of any genuine alterity: the programme transgressed by posing an 'otherness', at least in terms of the way the boundary of religious identity is construed.
The second item, 'Pakistani mullah arrested over claims he falsified evidence in girl's blasphemy case' (The Guardian, 3 September 2012, p. 14) told the story of how a Muslim cleric, so negatively focussed on the presence of Christianity within his Islamic milieu, planted information in order to frame the arrested child in what appears to be a put-up job designed to intensify pressure on local Christians: "We are not upset that the Christians have left and we will be pleased if they don't come back" said the accused mullah (p. 14). Even though the case was surely undermined, the prosecuting lawyer was reported nevertheless to be planning to press the case against the girl, accused of burning a prayer book that contained passages from the Qur'an.
Once again we may discern a 'fixation on the fixed' at play. An extreme reaction to a lived situation of religious plurality leads to a dual transgression: the reaction to the perceived 'transgression' of the interloping presence of a religious 'other' on the one hand, and arguably, on the other, the committing of a transgression against the Qur'an and Islam itself with respect to the Quranic injunctions concerning the People of the Book and the allowance of religious diversity, especially with respect to the presence of Christians and Jews within the Ummah. With these comments and examples in mind, let us now turn to the issue of the persistence of religion.
Why does religion persist?
Martin Riesebrodt (2010) in a recent book asks: Why has religion persisted across the course of human history? Secularists, he notes, had been predicting the end of religion for a long time. But religions continue to attract followers. Religion continues to thrive. In his attempt to answer the question, Riesebrodt concentrates on the concrete realities of worship, examining religious holidays, conversion stories, prophetic visions, and life-cycle events and argues that all religions promise to avert misfortune, help their followers manage crises, and bring both temporary blessings and eternal salvation.
Religion will not disappear as long as these promises continue to help people cope with life. Riesebrodt focusses on the salvific motif as the promissory focus; I would tend to the idea of 'transformation' as being more ideologically neutral and phenomenologically apposite. Indeed, in concert with an empirically-based approach such as Riesebrodt's, the phenomenology of religion has yielded a range of useful analyses and hermeneutical frameworks. Religion is no one thing. Religion comprises highly variegated phenomena. There is no single definition that does full justice to the range and complexity of phenomena that attracts the appellation of 'religion'.
Definitions must be provisional, hermeneutics inclusive, and methodologies apposite. Among many useful typologies, Ninian Smart's seven dimension analysis seems as good as any and is well recognized (see Smart, 1995; Pratt, 1993) . Without wishing to minimize any of the seven by way of a perceived coalescing, I suggest that when thinking about religion today, especially in respect to questions concerning its persistence and manifest problems, a focus on three broad dimensions, or clusters of dimensions if one uses Smart's typology, may offer fresh insight.
Three interwoven dimensions: narrative, ethical/experiential, metaphysical
The three key dimensions as I define and use them are as follows. First, there is the broadly conceived 'narrative' dimension which refers to the fund of 'story' in which an individual 'dwells' and that constitutes the primary reference for religious identity. Second, the ethical and experiential dimension which refers to the diverse ways in which the religious individual 'lives out' his or her religious identity in respect to values, attitudes and behavioural principals on the one hand -moral guidance for attitude and action -and, on the other, the manifold patterns of private and public religious practice, observance, ritual and so forth. Third, I suggest, there is the 'mental grounding' of religious life and sensibilities in terms of the metaphysical presuppositions that, for the most part, underlie religion and yet often remain quite unrecognized -or else highly confused and confusing. Furthermore, whilst often addressed as discrete items within various phenomenological typologies, I regard these three as very closely interrelated such that, together, they form the bedrock of definition and meaning when it comes to how we might understand the term 'religion'. Indeed, I suggest that it is in the interrelation of these three chief elements or dimensions that an understanding of religion's manifest persistence, and also the root of many contemporary religious problems, may be discerned and addressed.
The narrative dimension constitutes the arena of 'indwelling' that gives shape and substance to religious identity. It comprises, of course, the vast fund of myth, legend, story, history and so on that apply at multiple levelsoverarching macro (e.g. being 'Christian' or 'Buddhist'); local-macro as in Third, there is the metaphysical, or the mental / intellectual grounding framework or otherwise worldview presuppositions (Weltanschauungen) in which the narrative dimension, and its reception and outworking in terms of beliefs and behaviours, is set. However, metaphysics is a highly misunderstood term, with much confusion reigning because, when it comes to religion, metaphysics multi-levelled. Indeed, I suggest we can think of metaphysics as ranging over three 'orders' -the philosophical higher or firstorder; theological/ideological middle, or second-order; and the mythic/fanciful lower or third-order. It is not so much the case that these are to be conceived in some sort of hierarchized descending fashion but rather as in the manner of concentric circles of interrelated cognitions that radiate out from the first or central universal and foundational level (as in the idea of 'time') through differing levels or 'phases' wherein each subsequent presupposes the previous, but no earlier or more 'central' phase requires necessarily anything further 'out' from it, as it were. The point is, these three 'levels' or 'phases' of metaphysical conceptuality are interconnected and together underpin the ways in which religious narrative is 'read' and how the ethical and experiential elements of the religious life are engaged. Let us explore a little further.
The first is the arena of metaphysics strictly speaking -the mental or conceptual sub-stratum which enables us to comprehend and interact with the physical world in which our existence is set. This includes our construct of time -which in so-called Western traditions is lineal. In Eastern thinking it is cyclic. This distinction impacts very directly on narrative and ethical/experiential dimensions, as well as upon differences found in respect to middle-order religious metaphysics, as I shall show momentarily. Another of the 'higher order' metaphysical elements is epistemology, our views about knowledge: how it is we know what it is we know. Is knowledge that which is 'given', as it were, from 'outside' the human mental realm, or is it something which is discoverable, constructed and so produced by human ratiocination?
Both understandings can be found within religion; the latter tends to predominate in non-religious worldviews, such as secular scientism, and leads to a radical disjunction of materialist and non-materialist, or transcendental, constructions of what we mean by 'knowledge'. Finally, in this illustration of philosophical metaphysics, we can alight on the nature of reality itself -as in, for the most part, whether reality comprises the arena of the real or the illusory; whether it is only physical and material per se, or whether the transcendental or non-physical (emotions, intentions, willing, artistic creativity and so forth) also comprise 'reality'. These latter, depending on how they are understood in terms of higher order metaphysics, then govern perspectives on, for example, freewill, determinism, human rights and other values. One critical element of the first-order level of metaphysics which, I suggest, is inherent to religion, is what I would term the presupposition of 'ordered singularity' as a sort of metaphysical Urgrund understood as lying at the very heart of the human socius: human existence cannot abide chaos. Religions for the most part express this in terms of an undergirding unicity or monism:
there is, ultimately, only a singular reality; one divinity; one community; one way of being properly human. This oneness is portrayed as the reconciliation of variety and the bulwark against ultimate chaos. The metaphysical binary that accompanies the urgrund motif is played out in terms of narrative as well as ethics and experiential dimensions as a fundamental dynamic of the religious life. It is given evidence in the variety of oppositional posturing found throughout much religious discourse and dynamics, as we will see below.
Middle, or second-order, metaphysics refers to the specific conceptual structures underlying religious thought found in the developed sense of a theology or relevant ideology. Here we find the interconnected complexes of concept, logic and ideas. Three examples will suffice to make the point. But what of the third metaphysical element, the otherwise 'mythic' or 'fanciful' lower order? This is where religion takes on a distinctly 'other-worldly' and fairy-tale demeanour, I suggest. It is often what critics take as the essential metaphysical meaning or dimension of religion for it involves such elements as spiritual entities -angels and demons, for example -and alternate realms of or for human being ranging over hells, underworld, purgatory, and heavens.
And it can involve various supernatural dynamics as in spiritual warfare or astrological governance for instance. Thus the decisions and dynamics of the lived physical life are understood to mirror, or be directly linked to, a transcendent dimension that, in fact, amounts to a lower order metaphysic. This is where, often, the narrative dimension of a religion is read as directly referencing metaphysical reality. But this is neither of the higher or the middle order of metaphysics. Yet it is what, too often, religion is charged with being all about. It often constitutes the substance of beliefs that are peculiar to religion, beliefs which make of religion something quite 'other-worldly' for, indeed, they are about another, either parallel or superimposed, realm that from the perspective of the religion interacts with and impinges upon the physical realm inhabited by humanity. But such beliefs are of a different metaphysical order to those structures of understanding which, although perhaps cast as beliefs function more as undergirding presuppositions of understanding and conceptuality. As with any attempt to give structure or a framework to the ways in which we think and organise our cognitions, the picture I am conjuring needs to be understood as itself provisional and fluid; some items are more readily identified as first-order in this schema; some third-order -many hover across two or more of these 'orders' or levels. The point is to recognise that this sort of distinction is valid and meaningful. It enables the education for discrimination to which Woodhead refers is so it is true -in terms of being handed down from heaven to the sound of trumpets and supernaturally governed by prophets and celestial beings." He tends to equate religious truth with superstition and fairy-tale fancy; these latter being patently untrue, religion is inherently and inevitably false.
Nevertheless, religion serves valuable functions and meets authentic need.
De Botton (2012, p. 11) wishes "to remain a committed atheist (yet) nevertheless find religions sporadically useful, interesting and consoling." However, to give credit where due, he writes with considerable sensitivity and insight about religion and he is thus enamoured of the prospect "of importing certain of (religion's) ideas and practices into the secular realm" (de Botton 2012, p. 11).
Over half a century ago an attempt was made, with respect to Christianity, to demythologise religion with a view to stripping distracting mythic non-sense in order better to see the true sense of religion. religion not only about the charms of community. We learn also that a good community accepts just how much there is in us that doesn't really want community -or at least can't tolerate it in its ordered forms all the time" (2012, p. 66), and de Botton dreams of secular versions of religious rites and celebrations that would be good for communal health. On the other hand, with respect to a value such as kindness, which is exemplified within religious narratives, the "absence of religious belief in no way invalidates a continuing need for 'patron saints' of qualities like Courage, Friendship, Fidelity, Patience, Confidence or Scepticism" (2012, p. 95). Furthermore, the secular realm has much to learn from religion when it comes to truly effective education, according to de Botton. "Recognizing that we are as much sensory as cognitive creatures, they understand that they will need to use all possible resources to sway our minds" and so the broadly educational or formative methods of religion "deserve to be studied and adopted" (de Botton, 2012, pp.
161-2). Religion provides a perspective that the secular seems incapable of.
Among the cannier initiatives of religion…has been the provision of regular souvenirs of the transcendent, at morning prayer and the weekly service, at the harvest festival and baptism, on Yom Kippur and on Palm Sunday. The secular world is lacking an equivalent cycle of moments during which we, too, might be prodded to imaginatively step out of the earthly city and recalibrate our lives according to a larger and more cosmic set of measurements (p. 201).
Religious art, architecture and institutions all have more than merely residual value; they offer a model of elevating the mundane, of transcending the profane; indeed of accessing transcendental reference and meaning. And it is in the quaintly quixotic peregrinations in which de Botton indulges that this can be seen, as in his challenge to museum curators to enable art "to serve the needs of psychology as effectively as, for centuries, it has served those of theology"; thus art works should be co-opted "to the direct task of helping us to live: to achieve self-knowledge, to remember forgiveness and love and to stay sensitive to the pains suffered by our ever troubled species and its urgently imperilled planet" (p. 244). For de Botton, this transcendentally useful purpose of art would allow museums to become "our new churches" (p. 244).
Similarly, he argues that "we should revive and continue the underlying aims of religious architecture, by expressing these through secular temples designed to promote important emotions and abstract themes, rather than through sacred shrines dedicated to embodied deities" for such secular temples "would function as reminders of our hopes…they would all be connected through the ancient aspiration of sacred architecture: to place us for a time in a thoughtfully structured three-dimensional space, in order to educate and rebalance our souls" (p. 275). Presumably he is using 'souls' in a meaningful but non-supernatural sense! Much can be gained from religious institutions and their institutional life. "The question we face now is how to ally the very many good ideas which currently slumber in the recesses of intellectual life with those organizational tools, many of them religious in origin, which stand the best chance of giving them due impact in the world" (p. 299).
De Botton (2012, p. 311) concludes by asserting that
The essence of the argument presented here is that many of the problems of the modern soul can successfully be addressed by solutions put forward by religions, once those solutions have been dislodged from the supernatural structure within which they were first conceived. The wisdom of the faiths belongs to all of mankind, even the most rational among us, and deserves to be selectively reabsorbed by the supernatural's greatest enemies.
But, once again, the question can be asked: is there not an inherent problem in attempting to disconnect ethics (and the experiential dimension) from the narrative in order, simply, to avoid metaphysics -primarily of the lower order and a misunderstood middle order? Presumably not even de Botton wishes to eschew higher order metaphysics. So, in an ironic fashion, I suggest de Botton's quest to shear religion of all but residual value, and in the process reinvent a secular form of religion to carry that value, in terms at least of narrative and experiential alternatives, and given his misapprehension in respect to metaphysics, only serves to support my argument that these three broad dimensions are intimately interrelated. Rather like the old 'horse and carriage' song, "You can't have one without the other". However, I will give de Botton the last word -and yet in so doing I suggest he gives his own game away: "Religions are intermittently too useful, effective and intelligent to be abandoned to the religious alone" (p. 312). Quite.
Key contemporary problematic: contending with religious diversity
Having reflected upon factors involved in the persistence of religion, I turn now to examine what I suggest is the contemporary critical problematic of religion, par excellence, namely that of contending with religious diversity. If de Botton has implicitly challenged us to re-think the basic structure of religion as comprising narrative, ethical/experiential and metaphysical dimensions, how might the understanding of religion this yields contribute to our critique of contemporary religious problems and issues? As we know, 'plurality' simply names the state of affairs that reflects a diversity of items within a field of otherwise sameness. Instead of one ruling power we have a diversity of political parties vying to take their place in the ruling chamber, thus reflecting, and contributing to, the modern social diversity that makes for democracy.
Instead of all members of a nation or State belonging to one religion, or owning even the same allegiance and identity within one overarching religious tradition, there has ever been a measure of diversity of religious identity now exacerbated by the globalised mixture that sees all religions effectively everywhere, or near enough to something like that. Contending with this diversity as value-neutral fact or state of affairs is the underlying issue to the problem of exclusivist extremism, which in turn expresses a value-laden ideological position taken in response to the fact of plurality. This fact of religious plurality has been responded to in terms of at least the following paradigms, or ideological sets -Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Particularism and Pluralism (Hedges, 2010; Race and Hedges, 2008; Pratt, 2007a) ; there is no need to rehearse the details and manifold variations within these here. It is the first, exclusivism, which relates also to fundamentalism, that is itself varyingly linked to extremism and terrorism and so constitutes the problematic wherein the contending with diversity yields a reactionary and nugatory response:
plurality is rejected (see Pratt, 2007b; . This is made manifest in varying expressions of intolerance -the denial of diversity and the rejection of alterity (Pratt, 2011) . We see this expressed in many contemporary situations within society -with respect to gender identities, racial or ethnic groupings, as well as with religious allegiance and identity. In general terms such rejection is, as we saw above, a matter of attempting to maintain a state of uniformity and a defence of 'tradition'.
Religion often yields to a 'fixation with the fixed' and offers intimations immutability. In a threatening context of change and challenge, recourse to the unchangeable and the security of that which is presumed a received tradition of unyielding sameness, or alternatively the attempt to return a society to such a state once thought to exist in some pure form, now lost or besmirched and so requiring extraordinary effort to recover, lies at the heart of religious reaction that attempts to reinforce the borders of an ideological identity lager, and so inclined to take extreme action with those perceived to However, secularism itself is now a problem to the extent its more vociferous advocates often seek to exclude religion and the religious voice per se. So we may speak today of secular fundamentalism, for example; that is, a position on being secular that is as dogmatically narrow and exclusionary -especially of religion -as any hard-line religious fundamentalist is inimical of secularism (Pratt, 2013) . By contrast, secularity remains a much-needed paradigm shift within many contexts. Secularity means, primarily, the allowance for, and affirmation of, diversity. A secular society as such need not be opposed to the presence of religion. As Chris Nicols, key-note speaker at the 2012 New Zealand National Interfaith Forum, notes: "Secular society…is not antireligious…the secular society is religiously neutral and refuses to be ideologically committed to any one faith, despite the ardent hopes of dominant faiths all over the world" (February, 2012, unpublished) . It is the secularity of a secular society that allows for religious diversity. As Nicols contends: "A wholly secular society would embrace religious pluralism. It would recognise that there will be a range of different religious views, none of which will have precedence (and) the secular society (at its best) would be respectful of this religious range" (2012, unpublished) . Nonetheless, the utopian vision of a secular society positively predisposed to religious diversity is under threat from both religious extremism and reactionary forces that may be either religious or non-religious.
The point is rather made by philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2012) further to manifest what, perhaps, can be best described as variant forms of an 'impositional' fundamentalism. It is here that we discover the propensity for fundamentalism to yield to terrorism. A passive fundamentalist group to all intents and purposes 'minds its own business' so far as the rest of society is concerned; an assertive group perhaps somewhat less so, but an impositional group does not. An impositional fundamentalism wants to see things change to fit its view of how things should be, and will take steps to make its views known and, if need be, act imposingly to bring about change -by covert or overt interventions, including fomenting revolution or enacting terrorism. 
Conclusion: Putting it all together
Religion today is at a crossroads: in response to the current realities of diversity religious communities will either fall-back in to fundamentalist exclusivisms and extremisms, or advance into education and dialogical engagement so as to gain new religious self-understanding and understanding of religion. In response to diversity, extremist reaction and interfaith engagement occur already; but it is the latter which offers the prospect of promoting an affirmation of diversity thereby ameliorating the chief contemporary problem of religion, exclusivist rejection of alterity. Fear of the 'other', of difference and diversity, is the root problem besetting the contemporary context of religious plurality. A healthily secular society is accommodatingly pluralist; difference is not just 'tolerated' but embraced and valued. Correspondingly, and to the extent religion sits within secular society, a healthy religious identity is likewise accommodating of diversity -not treating religious and other alterities as implicit threats or invalid irruptions.
Religion is diverse and persistent, and manifests persistent problems. A genuine religious education promotes understanding with critical empathy; neither explaining religion away through the application of reductionist hermeneutics, nor idealising religion in some quasi-re-enchantment fashion, nor dodging the harsh realities and problematics that require rational critique, but rather presents religions objectively in regard to their complex diversity and dynamic depths of insight, impact, and values. Such an education -the hallmark of good Religious Studies in my view -equips for discernment and for proper discrimination between that which is authentic, congruent and of value, and that which is not. And such an education must attend to the interaction of narrative, pragmatic and metaphysical dimensions of religion if, in the end, both the persistence and the problems of religion are to be understood and properly addressed.
